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1 Introduction 
 
  In Switzerland, the system of fiscal equalisation between the intermediate 
level and the local level of government varies across the twenty-six cantons. 
This paper aims at introducing some of the common features of canton-level 
policies of fiscal equalisation between communes, and provides some more 
specific details on the system applied by the Canton Fribourg. 
 
  Starting out with a basic typology of local fiscal equalisation policy and its 
instruments, section 2 will present the character of local equalisation policy in 
the Canton Fribourg, with special regard to the peculiarly double-faced 
phenomenon of a formally vertical but latent horizontal equalisation. 
 
  Though the financial capacities of the constituent local communities 
continue to play a key role in determining the allocation of equalising grants by 
the Canton, there seems to be no appropriate method for measuring fiscal 
capacity without violating the principal objective of equalisation policy. 
Section 3 will show some of the related difficulties. 
 
  Section 4 provides a preliminary analysis on the incidence of local fiscal 
equalisation transfers. For this purpose, a hypothetical amount of 1'000'000 
Swiss francs from the budget of the Canton Fribourg will be allocated to the 
206 constituent communes on the basis of four different scenarios. This 
simulation is a preparatory work that paves the way for a more comprehensive 
analysis of incidences, a mandate given recently by the Cantonal Council to the 
Chair for Public Finance at the University of Fribourg. 
 
  Section 5 summarises the major findings of the study. 
 
 
2  The characteristics of local fiscal equalisation in the Cantons 
Understanding the real character of fiscal equalisation in the cantons, and 
especially in the Canton Fribourg, requires a clear conceptual demarcation 
between basic types of equalisation. Therefore, this opening section will 
provide a brief explanation on three basic distinctive criteria and the resulting 
classification of fiscal equalisation policies. 
 
Following the theory of public finance, local fiscal equalisation can 




Vertical fiscal equalisation implies that the communities concerned by fiscal 
equalisation are situated at different levels of government. In practice, at the 
                                                 
3    This distinction relies on the theory of David King who analyzed the applicability of 
equalization grants in the correction of vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalance. (King, 1984: 
137 ff.). Local  fiscal  equalisation  in  Switzerland     July  2003           4 
decentralised levels, this means a set of transfers provided to communes by 
the next higher level of government (in the Swiss case this is the cantonal 
level). 
Horizontal fiscal equalisation refers to the fiscal equalisation among 
communities situated at the same level of government. In terms of local 
fiscal equalisation this definition indicates a financial linkage among the 
communes themselves. 
 
Another distinction of fiscal equalisation policies is often made upon the 
basis consisting of (1) the origin of resources that serve equalisation, (2) the 
nature of equalisation transfers, and (3) the criteria that determine the size of 
transfers. 
 
Upon this complex basis we can differentiate between direct, indirect and 
mixed local fiscal equalisation. 
 
Direct fiscal equalisation is effected when the mid-tier government, or in 
some cases the communes themselves, participate in the maintenance of a 
general equalisation fund. The fund is distributed
4 on the basis of the fiscal 
capacity of communes and, optionally, by an additional set of criteria. Such 
grants are neither specific nor conditional, which means that they are not 
linked to any specific local public service. 
 
Indirect fiscal equalisation is being pursued when the transfers provided by 
the mid-tier government to the constituent communes are assigned to well-
defined local public tasks and at the same time are differentiated on the 
basis of the fiscal capacity of recipient communities. Accordingly, these 
transfers are specific conditional or specific block grants. The latter imply 




Mixed fiscal equalisation refers to the combination of direct and indirect 
systems. It implies the simultaneous existence of a common equalisation 
fund and a set of specific equalisation grants provided to communes by the 
intermediate level of government. 
 
The last terminological distinction relates to the budget constraint. Vertical 
indirect and vertical mixed fiscal equalisation may be financed either through 
open-end or closed-end grants.  
 
                                                 
4   Throughout the article, we use distribution and allocation as synonymous terms. 
5   Conditional grants are generally expressed in percentage of the expenditure for the granted 
function, i. e. they are input-oriented. If a commune spends more on a particular granted 
function, it receives more in proportion. Block grants, on the other hand, are output-oriented: 
for a particular function, the commune will receive the grant if the previously set target is 
performed in a proper manner. If the commune can reach the target with lower expenditure, it 
will still receive the total contracted amount of the grant, which means that its own residual 
contribution will be smaller than projected. Local  fiscal  equalisation  in  Switzerland     July  2003           5 
Open-end grants are provided to the local community for the execution of a 
certain public responsibility, whereby the amount of the grant is unlimited 
by law. The commune can claim the specific subsidy as long as it meets the 
eligibility criteria, whatever the financial position of the canton. 
 
Closed-end grants: contrary to open-end grants, the amount of a closed-end 
grant is kept between certain limits fixed by law.
6 In cases where the 
aggregate demand for funding exceeds the available resources, one or more 
selection criteria need to be introduced. 
 
Such classification may be done along a number of distinctive criteria that 
are different from the three mentioned above. From a policymaker's point of 
view this implies that fiscal equalisation may in principle be refined further by 
taking a growing number of criteria into consideration. The actual policy 
design depends on the combination of the selected categories. For the purposes 
of the present analysis, however, it is not necessary to introduce any further 
distinctive criteria.  
 
It is important to see that decisions about the combination of the selected 
categories are not quite innocent. Some combinations might lead to situations 
that cannot be explained directly from the chosen categories. For instance, the 
choice of an indirect and vertical equalisation policy based on closed-end 
grants will bring about an outcome that is rather different from what might 
have been expected. Such a policy design implies that the disposable resources 
are not infinite. For any specific local public task, awarding a targeted cantonal 
subsidy to one commune will necessarily restrict the amount of funding for 
other communes. Local governments must compete with each other for the 
available resources that are severely limited by the donor (higher-level) 
government. With equal access to the granting system, the result of such 
mechanism is a revenue transfer from communes enjoying a strong financial 
position to less affluent communes. A horizontal fiscal equalisation scheme 
would obviously lead to similar results.  
 
The Canton Fribourg in Switzerland is one typical case for the existence of 
such double-faceted policies. Formally, the local fiscal equalisation system of 
the Canton Fribourg can be characterised as follows: 
 
  It is vertical, since the resources involved in the equalisation are 
exclusively provided by the cantonal level. 
  It is indirect, since equalisation is effected through monetary transfers 
from cantonal authorities to local governments, and the use of such grants 
                                                 
6   The limit is "structural", which means that it is jointly discussed and decided by the canton 
and the communes while drafting the law. This limit, ultimately fixed by the law, cannot be 
modified in the annual budgetary process on grounds of the prevailing fiscal situation in the 
canton. This is often the case with revenue sharing where communes receive a fixed percentage 
of the total tax yield. In the Canton Fribourg, for example, the communes receive 30 % of the 
cantonal tax on vehicles. Local  fiscal  equalisation  in  Switzerland     July  2003           6 
by the recipients is linked to well-defined public functions. Currently there 
is no direct equalisation in the canton. 
  It operates with closed-end grants, at least for a wide range of public 
functions. 
 
Following the argumentation above, one cannot rest satisfied with the 
identification of the formal character of fiscal equalisation policy in the Canton 
Fribourg. The picture changes when considering the interaction between pure 
vertical equalisation and the predominant use of closed-end grants, insofar as 
the latter is likely to alter the actual direction of monetary streams. Therefore it 
is plausible to say that the fiscal equalisation system in the Canton Fribourg is 
formally vertical but latent horizontal. 
 
This finding about the latent existence of horizontal equalisation might 
weaken the ongoing argumentation against the introduction of explicit 
horizontal measures. The cantons of Neuchâtel, Vaud and Berne have recently 
adopted direct horizontal equalisation systems by setting up in their respective 
jurisdictions common equalisation funds fed by regular contributions of the 
financially strong communes.
7 In the Canton Fribourg, the formal introduction 
of horizontal equalisation has been on the agenda since the local equalisation 
reform of 1975. Yet, up to this date the legislative has not approved it, partly 
on the grounds that the severely fragmented municipal structure would be 
likely to pose an inequitable burden on large and rich communes.
8 The 
argument goes that communes capable of organising their public services in an 
efficient and expedient manner and thereby capable of strengthening their own 
financial position, should not be forced to compensate for the inefficiencies of 
those localities that are reluctant to organise themselves. This logic is also 
underpinned by the fact that the organic law (the Act of 25 September 1980 on 
the communes) gives a free hand to local governments to decide about 
                                                 
7   (a) Neuchâtel: « Loi sur le péréquation financière intercommunale du 10 janvier 2000 » 
(RSN 171.16), in force since January 2001. (b) Vaud: « Loi sur les communes du 28 février 
1956 » (R 1956, p.29). A new system of direct and horizontal equalisation has been introduced 
by referendum, May 21, 2000 within a larger reform package including a re-assignment of 
functions between the canton and the communes (in force since January 2001). (c) Bern: « 
Gesetz über den Finanz- und Lastenausgleich (FILAG) vom 27. November 2000 » (BELEX 
631.1). 
8   Among several other Swiss cantons, Fribourg also suffers from the excessive number of 
very small communes. Almost half of the communes in Fribourg count less than 400 
inhabitants (Dafflon, 1998: 131). Nevertheless the question of mandatory amalgamations – the 
so-called "Nordic approach" (Coucin of Europe, 1995) – has been a taboo since 1974, the year 
in which a related proposal of the Cantonal Council was approved by the Cantonal Parliament 
but firmly rejected by some 60% of the voters in a subsequent referendum. Despite the strong 
aversion of the smallest communes, the number of voluntary amalgamations has spectacularly 
risen since 1974. In the period between 1866 and 1973, not more than 9 municipal mergers 
were effected within the Canton, concerning 19 communes (-10 in the period), against 25 
amalgamations registered in the following 25 years (between 1974 and 1999), concerning 56 
communes (-22 in the period, ending with 245 communes) (Dafflon, 1998: 126). The 
outstanding number of mergers in the years 2000 to 2003 (22 new agreements, concerning 77 
communes, -52 in the three years’ period) is largely due to a favourable change in 1999 in the 
regulation of the related financial incentives (Dafflon, 2000a). See also (Grand Conseil, 1999). Local  fiscal  equalisation  in  Switzerland     July  2003           7 
voluntary co-operation or amalgamation. The introduction of horizontal 
equalisation measures should therefore be preceded by a careful examination of 
whether the efficiency of local service provision could further be enhanced. 
This might also include the reorganisation of public responsibilities between 
the canton and the communes.
9 
 
The analysis of the selected combination of distinguishing criteria allows us 
to formulate three further conclusions: 
 
¾  Due to the inherent diversity of formal transfer systems and their 
characteristics, equalisation programmes take such a wide variety that it is 
of absolute necessity 
(i)  to describe the various formal systems in an accurate manner; 
(ii)  to evaluate the actual (vertical and horizontal) incidence before 
starting to develop further equalisation programmes. Too often, new 
programmes are added to existing ones without the latter being 
carefully scrutinised and assessed with regard to the envisaged 
objectives. 
 
¾  The re-examination and reform of the current equalisation system are likely 
to necessitate, as a precondition, the reassignment of functions and/or 
revenues – or, like in the Canton Fribourg, the reorganisation of the 
communal level, e.g. the amalgamation of communes. Equalisation is 
nothing more than a temporary remedy for fiscal disequilibrium: it cannot 
eradicate the malpractice that leads to instability. 
 
¾  Indirect fiscal equalisation is likely to exacerbate the disparities among 
local communities. Under such a system the canton provides specific grants 
with two components: a basic rate that takes into account incentive or any 
other technical measures of allocation (based on costs, economies of scale, 
spill-over benefits etc.), and an additional equalising component that 
depends on the fiscal capacity of the commune. The recipient commune can 
therefore benefit from the cantonal equalisation policy only insofar as it has 
the capacity to finance the residual expenditure not covered by the grant. 
Although the equalising component enhances the total rate of the grant, 
communes with low fiscal capacity can seldom afford to provide the 
residual funding for the granted project, for which reason they are 
practically excluded from the equalisation benefits. It is a vicious circle. 
 
 
                                                 
9   When the draft law of 12 July 1991 on fiscal equalisation was discussed in the Cantonal 
Parliament of Fribourg, the ad-hoc committee proposed to return the draft law to the Cantonal 
Council with the argument that the executive should present a project for encouraging the 
amalgamation of communes before any discussion about direct equalisation, whether vertical 
or horizontal. See (Grand Conseil, 1992: 3).  Local  fiscal  equalisation  in  Switzerland     July  2003           8 
3  The challenge of measuring local fiscal capacity 
It is deemed to be obvious that the allocation of equalisation grants must 
follow a sound and well-designed pattern, otherwise the principles of equity 
and efficiency may be hurt. At the local level, allocation on the basis of fiscal 
capacity has proved to be by far the most feasible pattern up to this date.
10 
However, measuring the fiscal capacity of a commune may call for 
complicated formulas. In addition, it leads to serious clashes against certain 
basic principles of federalism such as jurisdictional autonomy and distribution 
equity. In fact, one of the particularities of fiscal equalisation is the special 
relation between ends and means. It is almost impossible to distinguish 
between these two, which means that defining the formula for measuring fiscal 
capacity will at the same time fix the objective (or the extent) of equalisation. 
In this section the reader will be confronted with some of the related problems 
that are rather typical to fiscal equalisation systems in federal or highly 
decentralised countries. 
 
Following the methodological excursion in sub-section 3.1 concerning the 
measurement of fiscal capacity, sub-section 3.2 will discuss the problems 
related to the design of the global fiscal capacity formula. Finally, sub-section 
3.3 will present how the measurement of fiscal capacity and the classification 
of communes can clash with the objectives of local equalisation policy. 
 
 
3.1   The current method of measuring fiscal capacity  
 
From a methodological point of view, the current system of local fiscal 
equalisation in the Canton Fribourg is based on the classification of communes 
according to their fiscal capacity. This classification serves as a starting point 
for calculating the available equalisation grants to be transferred to, and the 
required financial contributions to be paid by each commune. The size of the 
equalisation grant to be transferred to a given commune depends on its 
“rating”, i.e. the class it belongs to. This mechanism relies on the assumption 
that the position of a commune in one class or another reflects its fiscal 
capacity. 
 
                                                 
10   Alternative solutions include the measurement of economic capacity and/or financial 
capacity. The first one necessitates the calculation of a "municipal net income" indicator, 
similar to the existing NIC (net income of the canton; for a methodology of calculation see the 
Statistical Yearbook of Switzerland, Federal Office of Statistics, Zürich 2001: 224), that would 
encompass the totality of incomes generated by all economic activities of the inhabitants and 
perhaps of those who carry on activities in the respective jurisdiction. Considering that local 
economies are highly open economies (Oates, 1972: 4), it is extremely difficult to develop such 
an indicator. Measuring financial capacity, which includes among others the revenues from 
rents and royalties on local government property, is more feasible. Yet several public 
economists reject this second alternative on the grounds that it does not clearly accentuate the 
resources of the local public sector within the total amount of national resources. Local  fiscal  equalisation  in  Switzerland     July  2003           9 
 
3.1.1   Measuring fiscal capacity 
 
The current classification underlies the following three principles (Conseil 
d'État, 1989a): 
 
Efficacy  This principle allows for a more appropriate differentiation of aid, 
on the basis of a even spreading of communes across the different 
classes of fiscal capacity. 
Justice  The equalisation may not favour those communes that themselves do 
not take any measure to stabilise their financial position. The criteria 
applied to the classification must reflect in an equitable manner both 
the benefits and the inconveniences deriving from the geographic, 
historic or economic environment of any given commune. 
Clarity  The classification method must be verifiable for all stakeholders and 
be based on unambiguous statistics. 
 
The first classification of communes that served the allocation of public 
resources between the Canton Fribourg and its communes, and implied a sort 
of vertical indirect fiscal equalisation, appeared in 1877 (Dafflon, 1981: 41). 
Since that time, the classification system has undergone five significant 
changes (in the years 1902, 1932, 1963, 1975 and 1990). From 1990, the 
calculation of the global index of fiscal capacity relies upon the following two 
indicators, often referred to as the "criteria" of measurement, A and B below 
(Département des communes, 1989). 
 
A.   Indicator of local fiscal resources 
It is based on the average per-capita revenues of year t and the preceding 
year t-1, deriving from the cantonal taxes on personal income and wealth, as 
well as on corporate profits and capital within the commune, compared to the 
per-capita tax receipts calculated for the canton as a whole. 
 
 
where  Tcantonal (i)    total receipts of cantonal taxes in the commune i  
(average receipts of years t and t-1) 
  Σ  Tcantonal (i)   total receipts of cantonal taxes in the Canton Fribourg 
(average receipts of years t and t-1) 
   LPi        legal population of commune i in year t 
   i         subscript for the 206 communes at the time of  
calculation 
 
The indicator of local fiscal resources is quantified in points. The cantonal 
average has a value of 100 points; the position of the individual commune is 
proportionally adjusted to this reference value. 
 











i) (LFR   resources   fiscal   local   of Indicator        (1)Local  fiscal  equalisation  in  Switzerland     July  2003           10 
Since this indicator is based not on the effectively collected tax revenues but 
rather on the tax capacity of the commune, here we are dealing with a kind of 
representative tax system (RTS) on the cantonal level.
11 Several Swiss cantons 
apply the RTS to estimate the tax capacity of their constituency. 
 
 
B.   Indicator of local financial needs 
In addition to the local potential for obtaining fiscal resources, some cantons 
also consider expenditures or financial needs in a simultaneous formula. In the 
Canton Fribourg, local financial needs (or the costs of public services) are 
measured by a combination of three indices: population density, economic 
activity and demographic growth. 
 
  Population density index(PD) 
It is plausible to assume that the organisation of public services will pose a 
heavier financial burden on relatively dispersed communities, as well as on 
those that live under geographically unfavourable conditions. The unit cost of 
production of certain public services, characterised by growing economies of 
scale, is obviously lower in densely populated communes than in scattered 
communities. The lower the density of the population, the more accentuated 
the financial needs of the commune. A low population density leads to a 




where  Ai     geographical area of commune i 
   RPi    resident population of commune i in year t 
 
 
  Economic activity index(EA) 
Communes assuming the role of a regional centre are induced to deliver 
some specific public services linked to the general economic activity. 
Operating with the inverse  rate of activity (or employment) in the formula 
reflects the fact that the fiscal burden tends to grow disproportionately in 
communes charged with district-level or regional public responsibilities. Thus, 
the higher the rate of activity in any commune i, the lower its index EAi. The 
rate of activity (employment) establishes a relationship between the number of 
working places and the total size of population in any given community. 
Thereby it allows distinguishing between communes that assume the role of a 
regional centre and those that have a predominantly residential character or 
those that for any other reason show a less intensive economic activity. 
                                                 
11  For a definition of the RTS, see (Cordes, Ebel and Gravelle, 1999: 360 ff.) The system is 
also applied in Canada (Bird and Slacke, 1990) and in France (Gilbert, 1997). 
100
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where  Li   number of full-time working places in commune i 
   LPi   legal population of commune i in year t 
 
 
  Demographic growth index(DG) 
The third index reflects the fact that communes registering a substantial 
growth of their population in comparison to the cantonal average tend to 




where    LP
(t)
i   legal population of commune i in year t 
   LP
(t-10)
i  legal population of commune i in year t-10 (ten years before). 
 
The DG index value takes into account half of the difference between the 
actual demographic growth in a commune for the last ten years and the average 
demographic growth in the canton for the same period. The inversion of the 
difference in the numerator means that if a commune has a rate of population 
growth higher than average, then the index value decreases below 100 points 
by half of the difference. This lowers the total index, which ensures a higher 
amount of grant for that particular commune. 
 
The actual value of each of the three indices above is expressed in points. 
The indicator of local financial needs in calculated as the simple arithmetic 
average of the three index values: 
 
 
where PDi    indicator of population density in commune i 
   E A i    indicator of economic activity in commune i 
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C.   An abandoned indicator 
Until 1989, the global index of local fiscal capacity included a third indicator, 
which served to measure local fiscal effort. The underlying argument was the 
recognition that it is not justifiable to provide grants to those communes that do 
not make the slightest effort to raise funds and participate in the financing of 
their public services. However, the criterion of fiscal effort clashed with the 
fundamental principle of local fiscal autonomy and proved to be 
counterproductive with regard to cost savings. Furthermore it has led to severe 
discriminatory effects as well as to abusive behaviour at a number of local 
governments (Conseil d'État, 1989a and Dafflon, 1981: 110-112). 
 
D.   The global index 
In the current system, each of the two indicators – the indicator of local 
fiscal resources and the indicator of local financial needs – allows a ranking of 
the communes, whereby the cantonal average is valued at 100 points, and the 
indicator values of each commune are calculated with reference to this average. 
In any commune, the global index of fiscal capacity corresponds to the 
weighted average of the scores obtained by the partial classifications. A weight 
of 2/3 is given to the indicator of local fiscal resources, while the indicator of 
local financial needs weighs 1/3 in the global index value. 
 
where LFRi   indicator of local fiscal resources in commune i 
   L F N i   indicator of local financial needs in commune i 
 
3.1.2  The classification of communes 
 
Finally, the communes are divided into six classes according to the 
respective value of their global fiscal capacity index. This is particular to the 
equalisation system in the Canton Fribourg.




i.  Communes with the strongest fiscal capacity (highest global index value) 
are attributed to class 1; class 6 contains the communes with the weakest 
fiscal capacity. 
ii.  The burdens and the benefits of the equalisation policy must be allocated 
among the communes in such a way that no class is left out of 
consideration. 
iii.  An equal number of classes must be reserved for communes with an index 
value superior to the cantonal average, on the one hand, and for 
communes whose index value is below the cantonal average, on the other 
                                                 
12   Most cantons directly use the index of fiscal capacity for calculating the amount of 
equalisation grant for each commune. Using the index for a classification of the communes in 
six classes, then using the classes to fix the amount of grant is peculiar to the Canton Fribourg.  
13  See (Conseil d'État, 1989a and 1989b). This decree has laid down the fundaments of the 
current classification method. 
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hand. This implies that the separation line between rich and poor 
communes (corresponding to the average index value of 100 points) is 
drawn between class 3 and class 4. 
iv.  The concentration of the majority of communes in one single class must 
be avoided. 
 
In order to ensure a more or less balanced probability of the distribution of 
communes across the six classes, the method of moving averages is applied 
(see Annex 1). The procedure is the following. The primary distribution of 
communes into two major groups is effectuated by comparing local index 
values to the cantonal average (100 points), as the third principle above 
suggests. In the second step the average index values for these two groups are 
calculated, so that the upper limit of class 3 and the lower limit of class 4 can 
be drawn. These two thresholds determine the range of communes constituting 
the classes 3 and 4. The calculation of the average index values for the rest of 
the communes leads to the threshold values separating class 2 from class 1, on 
the one hand, and classes 5 from class 6, on the other hand. However, this 
procedure implies beforehand that each commune has a higher probability to 
fall into classes 3 and 4 than into any other classes.
14 This would clash with the 
fourth principle mentioned above which calls upon avoiding the concentration 
of communes in one class or another. In order to correct the bias and ensure an 
a priori identical probability for all six classes, the threshold values separating 
class 3 from class 2 on the one hand, and class 4 from class 5 on the other 
hand, are calculated on the basis of an adjusted formula: 
 
Upper limit of class 3 (threshold to class 2) = 100 + 2/3 x C1, 2, 3 
Lower limit of class 4 (threshold to class 5) = 100 – 2/3 x (C4, 5, 6 –100) 
where 
E 1, 2, 3: the average of the communal fiscal capacity index values in classes 1, 2 and 3;  
E4, 5, 6: the average of the communal fiscal capacity index values in classes 4, 5 and 6.  
 
This correction has been applied since 1979 (Conseil d'État, 1978 and 






                                                 
14   At each step of the partition procedure, the probability for a commune to fall in one class or 
another is ¼. The final probability value results from the multiplication of partial probability 
values obtained at each step of the procedure. Therefore it is obvious that the probability (25.0 
%) of falling into classes 3 or 4 is higher than the probability of falling into classes 1, 2, 5 or 6 
(12.5 %). The system is thus biased in favour of classes 3 and 4, although it is a priori 
recognised that the distribution probability should be 100/6 = 16.66 % for each of the six 
classes (Dafflon, 1981: 110-112).  Local  fiscal  equalisation  in  Switzerland     July  2003           14 
3.2  Four remarks on the design of the global fiscal capacity index 
With regard to the design of the global fiscal capacity index, at least four 
questions must be raised. Through resuming formula (6) in a more detailed 
form we first provide an overview of these questions. 
 









Beside the partial tax sovereignty that implies a free choice between ability-
to-pay taxes and user charges, communes in Switzerland do not enjoy but a 
certain degree of tax flexibility. This means that communes are tied to the tax 
system of their canton: they are not entitled to define the taxes to be raised, nor 
to alter the cantonal tax scheme. However, they can decide on the annual 




The formula of local fiscal resources does not contain the communal 
coefficient as a variable. To be more accurate, the formula automatically 
reckons with a tax coefficient of 1.0, as if every local government levied local 
taxes corresponding in size to 100 % of the canton's taxes. The underlying 
reason for this methodological simplification is that no other way has been 
found to avoid the distortion that could possibly derive from the existing tax 
competition between the communes. If local coefficients were taken into 
consideration, then the equalisation policy would favour the communes 
applying lower coefficients with apparently low tax yield against those that 
have opted for higher coefficients. Given the current "race to the bottom" of 
local tax rates in Switzerland, in the statistics too many communes would 
appear to have a low capacity, which would raise the overall demand for 
                                                 
15   The general formula of tax revenue is the following (Dafflon, 2000b: 269ff): 
T = t ×  [ B - (D1, D2, D3, …Di, … Dn )] ×  ( KFed  + Kcanton + Kcommune ) 
where  T   revenue from a tax; "t"  the tax rate schedule;  B  gross tax base; D possible 
deductions from the tax base and K  annual coefficient aiming at a balanced (current ?) budget. 
Tax flexibility means that a local government can at least decide on the tax coefficient Kcommune 
but has no influence on the rest of the formula or the kinds of tax to be raised. This is typically 
what the international literature calls piggy-back taxes. 
 Q4: why these weights? 
(2/3 and 1/3) 
 Q1: why cantonal 
tax revenue? 
 Q2: why these three 
components? 
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equalisation transfers. In fact, a great number of communes tend to decrease 
the share of direct tax revenues in the local budget by reducing their tax 
coefficient, and simultaneously they introduce user charges to make up for the 
lost tax revenue. Since user charges do not appear in the formula of local fiscal 
resources, communes refraining from this source of revenue would suffer a 
negative discrimination by the allocation of equalisation grants. Therefore, 
starting out from a communal tax level generalised at 100 % of the cantonal 
taxes helps to ensure the neutrality and the comparability of fiscal resources 
among the communes. 
 
A more important question might be raised in relation to the representative 
tax system that is applied here (see section 3.1.1). The tax capacity in any RTS 
is estimated upon the basis of a limited range of taxes. The choice of taxes 
cannot be but arbitrary, even though it may rely on sound economic arguments. 
The key question is whether the selection of taxes featuring in the RTS of the 
Canton Fribourg is appropriate or not. Other taxes could just as well have been 
added to the system, yet another could have been eliminated from it. It is 
deemed to be obvious that taxes yielding regular revenue (e.g., tax on 
immovable property) perform better in the RTS than taxes with irregular 
receipts (e.g., tax on capital benefit). 
 
Question 2 
Several cantons have included a needs indicator into their global formula of 
fiscal capacity. The choice of the “ingredients” of such a needs indicator relies 
heavily on the actual definition of communal needs and public service costs. 
Nevertheless, it can also be the result of careful deliberation and lengthy 
negotiations and finally reflect the political and financial interests of those 
communes that sit close enough to the "meat pot", i.e. those which are the most 
capable of influencing the decision-making process that leads to the actual 
allocation pattern. 
 
In the Canton Fribourg, the result of such negotiations is a set of partial 
indices which, however, cross-cut each other. Considering the eligibility of 
communes for equalisation aid and the amount of available funds, the 
population density index clearly favours the scarcely populated communes 
against densely populated ones. However, as the argument goes, densely 
populated communes are more involved in regional economic activities whose 
spill-over effects may in some cases be substantial. In order to offset this 
imbalance and take account of the increased public responsibilities of densely 
populated communities, an economic activity indicator has also been taken up 
into the formula. Indeed, industrial towns and cities tend to have a higher rate 
of activity than communes heavily relying on agriculture or tourism. Since 
agriculture, tourism and industry obviously complement each other within 
certain geographic boundaries and all these activities contribute to the sound 
economic development of a region, it is not expedient to favour any of them to 
the detriment of the other sectors. 
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Thus the economic activity indicator favours the densely populated but 
economically active communes against the scarcely populated ones and, by 
doing so it moderates the effect of the population density indicator. There is, 
however, a third group of communes that do not meet any of these two 
eligibility criteria. These are communes with a growing population but a low 
rate of economic activity, situated mainly in the agglomeration of large cities. 
These communes, too, must be able to meet some basic needs of their 
inhabitants (like road infrastructure, primary education and basic health 
services), while their revenue resources are fairly low, due to the scarce 
economic activity in their jurisdiction. To accommodate the interests of this 
group, the demographic growth index has been added to the formula. 
According to the formal argumentation, this third index is supposed to 
compensate for the imbalances caused by the first two indices. 
 
The reasoning behind each of the three indices may be correct in itself. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to calculating their average to figure out the actual 
value of the financial needs indicator for each commune, the scores fall into a 
fairly short interval due to the multiple balancing mechanisms built into the 
formula. This cross-cutting obviously weakens, if not annihilates, the 




The fact that two components of the financial needs indicator (the 
population density index and the economic activity index) contain cube root 
variables, might suggest to an outsider that the calculation method rests on a 
solid econometric foundation. There is indeed an official argument which says 
that taking the cube root of the concerning variables is essential for bringing 
down the indicator values to a level where they are easy to handle in an 
arithmetic sense. Indeed, values around 100-150 points can easily be integrated 
into the global fiscal capacity index, whereas their multiples would certainly 
distort the final calculation. However, we have not found any palpable 
argument for the choice of this particular root factor. If it is purely about the 
diminution of the index values, then the square root, the fourth root or the fifth 
root could do the job just as properly as the cube root. Nevertheless, the 
democratic process of decision-making dictated a different logic in this case, 
whereby political interests have proved to be dominant over economic 
considerations. Therefore the currently applied method is an outcome of sheer 
bargaining and strategic manoeuvres by between the decision-makers, and it is 




A similarly pseudo-scientific approach can be detected in the method of 
weighting the variables. As section 3.1.1 has shown, the global index of fiscal 
capacity for any commune is calculated as the weighted average of the scores 
obtained by the two partial classifications. The indicator of local financial 
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counts with a weight of 2/3 within the global index value. According to the 
official argument, the choice of weights reflects the idea that the calculation of 
the fiscal resources indicator is expected to bring a relatively accurate result, 
whereas the proper quantification of local financial needs is much more 
difficult, if not straight away impossible. Nevertheless, the reasoning that 
underlies this particular weight distribution is fairly questionable. Instead of the 
ratio of 1/3 to 2/3, various other ratios could just as well have been chosen. The 
truth is that, again, the decision about these particular weights is an outcome of 
a lengthy political debate whereby some influential members of the decision-
making committee have managed to carry their point in favour of the 
communes they were representing. 
 
 
3.3   Major concerns related to the capacity-based classification of 
communes
 
With regard to the capacity-based classification of communes, there are two 
relevant points to be discussed in the case of canton Fribourg. Section 3.3.1 
deals with the key question whether it is adequate and efficient to have needs 
(costs) equalisation linked with revenue equalisation in a single fiscal capacity 
formula. Section 3.3.2 will provide a brief critical analysis of the current 
classification schedule. 
 
3.3.1    Linking needs equalisation with revenue equalisation 
 
As a starting point in the discussion we can suppose that any local 
government is spurred by its electorate to provide local residents with a range 
public services. The volume of provided services depends on both the 
expenditure needs and the financial resources of the local community. Both the 
needs and the available resources depend heavily on geographic, demographic, 
socio-economic and other factors. Local needs are further determined by legal 
regulations concerning the group of mandatory public goods that local 
government must provide by all means, and they also vary according to the 
particular preferences of the local residents. The difference in needs and 
resources between localities is frequently referred to as local fiscal disparity. 
 
Local fiscal equalisation, within a federal (or at least strongly decentralised) 
system of government, refers to attempts made at the reduction of fiscal 
disparities among communes by monetary transfers. According to the 
common-sense definition, fiscal disparity at the communal level can be a 
variation (1) in the revenue-raising capacity of the communes, (2) in the unit 
cost of public services or (3) in the local choices for certain preferred local 
public services. Each local fiscal equalisation measure can thus result in either 
resource equalisation or  cost (or needs) equalisation, respectively, while 
disparities in local choices usually stay outside the scope of equalisation, as 
will be explained later. Cost (needs) equalisation should principally be a 
vertical equalisation, while resource equalisation can also be effectuated on the 
horizontal level. 
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With regard to needs equalisation, it is important to point out that the needs 
equalisation policy does not necessarily have to address the totality of local 
expenditure needs. As denoted above, any local government must provide by 
law a specific group of public goods in order to reach a minimum service level 
prescribed by the federal state or the canton. Whatever the volume of locally 
available resources, the unit costs of producing these goods up to the minimum 
level may vary from one community to another, due to geographic, 
demographic, socio-economic factors, population size and many other 
variables. Since the decisions concerning the provision of this minimum level 
are beyond the control of the communes, differences in the production costs 
must in principle be fully compensated by that level of government which 
expects the commune to provide the given public service (procurer pay 
principle). Production cost differentials may be compensated (in other words, 
vertical needs equalisation can be done) with specific grants linked to the 
standard costs of the service.
 16 
 
On the other hand, local governments in a federal system are normally free 
to produce any additional public goods and services beyond the legally defined 
minimum level, as well as to exceed cantonal or federal quality norms in the 
execution of the prescribed public tasks. Fiscal disparities deriving from the 
budgetary autonomy of communes need not necessarily be handled by the 
canton. Local fiscal equalisation can (and should) be restricted to the repression 
of fiscal disparities down to the limit where the provision of the required 
minimum level of local services is ensured. 
 
In the case of Fribourg, a grievous concern has lately emerged in this 
respect. It has been recognised that differences in the unit costs of public 
services across communes are not adequately taken into account by the 
allocation of cantonal equalisation funds. The classification of communes 
occurs upon the basis of the global fiscal capacity index described above, in 
which the needs component fails to include an indicator of cost differences. 
While it is generally acknowledged that constructing one kilometre of a 
motorway of a certain quality is more expensive on a mountainous area than it 
is on a plain area, the current formula takes no account of the difference in unit 
costs. The needs criterion is measured solely by counterbalancing the indices of 
population density, economic activity and demographic growth, which 
obviously cannot make up for the lack of a cost differential measure. In fact, 
measuring local differences in unit costs is not uncomplicated. Yet a system of 
norms could eventually be set up to establish a link between the cost 




                                                 
16   Such equalisation, however, may lose legitimacy in certain cases. When the excessive costs 
of public services and the failure to realise economies of scale result from the extremely large 
number of small communes, the possibility of the reorganisation of public responsibilities 
through inter-communal co-operation and amalgamation should first be considered. (See also: 
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3.3.2  The classification schedule 
 
  With regard to the capacity-based classification of communes in the Canton 
of Fribourg, another worry of policy-makers is the roughness of the 
classification schedule. The actual system operates with weights developed 
from the inverse class of each commune. Inverse class is defined as the 
hypothetical class number that a commune would be assigned if the series of 
class numbers followed in reverse order. Thus, for communes situated in class 
6 the inverse class is 1, for communes in class 5 it is 2, for those in class 4 it is 
3 etc. Obviously, this series of inverse classes is the outcome of a 
methodological choice which corresponds to the current practice. It is 
important to see that several other reverse scales are conceivable, e.g., one that 
extends from 7 to 2: 
 
Class  1  2  3 4 5 6 
Weight  6  5  4 3 2 1 
7  6  5 4 3 2 
8  7  6 5 4 3 
Other possible 
weight series 
…        
 
The relative weights in the actual classification (from 6 to 1) imply that the 
multiplicator of the number of inhabitants in a commune in class 1 will be six 
times as large as the multiplicator of applied to a commune in class 6. If a 
commune jumps from class 6 to class 5, the weight applied in the formula will 
double (from 1 to 2). With a series of inverse weights ranging from 7 to 2 or 
from 8 to 3, the same jump would result in a 1.5 fold or 1.25 fold increase of 
the applicable weight, respectively. Again, the choice of a particular series of 
inverse weights associated with the classification is not an "innocent" technical 
choice; the way to such result is paved with the political intention of 
influencing the equalisation outcome. 
 
In the actual system of weights ranging from 6 to 1, communes jumping one 
class higher on the scale due to a growth in their global fiscal capacity from the 
previous period (thus moving from class 2 to 1, or from class 5 to 4 etc.) face a 
significant rise in their financial contribution to the cantonal equalisation 
measures. On the other hand, communes descending by one class (that is 
towards class 6) will benefit from a sharp rise of the grant amount. A 
consequence of this phenomenon is that the system is naturally susceptible to 
be blocked. Especially the communes situated at the upper extreme of a class 
interval are interested in preserving their position in the same class as long as 
possible.  
 
In search for a remedy to this problem, in the spring of 2000 the Cantonal 
Council gave a mandate to an expert team to explore the potential effects of 
changing the range of classes into a continual scale (Conseil d'État, 2000a). In 
this new system, each commune would be represented by the actual value of its 
global index of fiscal capacity. A simulation was carried out, with a focus on 
seven domains of equalisation including primary education. Results showed 
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burden of equalisation in the poorest communes (classes 6 and 5), while it 
would alleviate the charge on those who live in rich communes (classes 2 and 
3). As a consequence, the inter-communal solidarity – a basic objective of 
equalisation – would be partly dismantled. 
 
However, the quest for an optimum solution has not yet been concluded. As 
a matter of fact, in some recent laws the canton of Fribourg has started to 
employ the global indices of fiscal capacity rather than the classification 
schedule derived from them.
17 Very little attention has been paid to this fact so 
far, although it marks a major milestone in the development of the transfer 
system. Another sign of this trend away from classification and towards the use 
of a continuous scale is a recent research project initiated by the canton itself. 
At the end of 2002, the Chair for Public Finance at the University of Fribourg 
received a mandate from the Cantonal Council to analyse the distributional 
incidences generated by the current system of fiscal equalisation transfers in 
the canton. On the medium term, based on the results of this analysis, the 
council will possibly decide to explore the potential for a policy review. 
Section 4 of this article provides some insight to the start-up phase of the 
university research project. 
 
4    The distributional incidences of fiscal equalisation in the Canton 
Fribourg 
 
The execution of the cantonal mandate mentioned in section 3.3.2 relies on 
a working plan which envisages splitting the analysis of the distributional 
incidences of equalisation grants in the Canton Fribourg into four phases: 
 
Phase 1  Simulation of the incidences resulting from the distribution of a 
hypothetical amount of one million Swiss francs from the 
cantonal budget to the 206 constituent communes with various 
formulas applied in the present system. 
Phase 2    Identification of cantonal grant programmes and corresponding 
monetary flows that contain one or more equalising components. 
Phase 3    Revision of the equalisation formulas currently applied in the 
Canton Fribourg. 
Phase 4    Application of the simulation (Phase 1) to the newly developed 
formulas. Analysis of the volume and quality of equalisation. 
 
This section presents the methodology and the results of a preliminary work 
that paves the way to Phase 1 of the mandate. 
                                                 
17 See (a) Law of the Canton Fribourg of October 8, 1992, on the implementation of the federal 
legislation concerning the support for victims of infringements; (b) Decree of the Canton 
Fribourg of November 11, 1998, on the encouragement of amalgamations between communes; 
(c) Law of the Canton Fribourg of November 26, 1998, amending the law of November 14, 
1991, on social aid; (d) Law of the Canton Fribourg of March 23, 2000, on the medical-social 
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4.1   Methodology 
  The vertical and indirect fiscal equalisation policy, in the form as it is 
realised in the Canton Fribourg, implies that equalisation resources are 
transferred from the canton to the communes through a range of specific grant 
programmes
18 in which the distribution formula regularly contains one or more 
equalising components. Currently there are more than twenty grant 
programmes with an equalising component in the Canton Fribourg. In Phase 1 
of the mandate and, accordingly, in the preparatory simulation to be presented 
here, we have chosen not to start immediately with the individual analysis of 
these grant programmes. At the start-up, the emphasis is rather laid on the 
incidences generated by different patterns of distribution. Therefore we have 
allocated a hypothetical amount of one million Swiss francs from the cantonal 
budget to the 206 constituent communes on the basis of four different 
distribution scenarios. The simulation relies on a database containing relevant 
statistics on each of the 206 communes. 
 
  Annex 2 shows a fragment of our simulation worksheet. Instead of 
demonstrating the individual records of each of the 206 communes registered 
in the Canton Fribourg, we have limited ourselves to the presentation of the 
table headlines, the respective data series for one selected commune 
(Arconciel), as well as the cantonal aggregates (where applicable).
19 The reason 
for including this worksheet sample in the Annexes is to demonstrate the 
procedure by which (i) the global index of fiscal capacity, (ii) the amount of 
transfer receipts in S1, S2, and S3, and (iii) the divergence of these amounts 
from the receipts defined for S0 have been calculated for each commune. 
 
  The worksheet is structured as follows: input data are given in columns 1 to 
11, while columns 12 to 21 contain the index values as generated by equations 
1 to 6 (section 3.1.1). Finally, columns 21 to 35 show the results of the 




  The range of input data is identical to the standard database that the 
Department of Communes of the Canton Fribourg uses in order to classify the 
communes at regular stated intervals. It includes the following parameters 
(Annex 2): 
 
column 1    Federal identification number of commune i 
column 2    Name of commune i 
column 3    Legal population of commune i as of  December 31, 2000  
column 4    Resident population of commune i as of  December 31, 2000 
column 5    Legal population of commune i as of  December 31, 1990 
column 6    Area of commune i in km
2 
column 7    Number of full-time employed in commune i 
                                                 
18   For the definition of specific grants, see section 2. 
19 Readers interested in the detailed statistics of individual communes are kindly requested to 
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column 8    Tax receipts of commune i in 1999 in Swiss francs, 
where tax receipts in period t = (cantonal taxes on the revenue and fortune of 
individuals received by commune i in period t) + (cantonal taxes on the profit 
and capital of legal persons received by commune i in period t) 
column 9    Tax receipts of commune i in 1998 
column 10  Average tax receipts in the commune i in 1999 and 1998: columns [8]+[9] : 2 
column 11  Per-capita average tax receipts in the commune i 1998-1989: column [10] : 3. 
 
Calculated indices 
  Upon the basis of the input data, the component indices of fiscal capacity 
and the global index are calculated for each commune. These are the index 
values that the Canton Fribourg considers as valid for the year 2001/2002. The 
steps of the calculation can be followed across columns 12 to 21 (all 
parameters apply to commune i): 
 
column 12    Indicator of local fiscal resources: column [11] x 100 divided by the average 
          cantonal tax receipts, 2422,59 francs, (see section 3.1.1, equation 1) 
column 13  Population density: columns [4] : [6] 
column 14  Population density index (section 3.1.1, equation 2) 
column 15  Rate of economic activity: columns [7] : [3] 
column 16  Economic activity index (section 3.1.1, equation 3) 
column 17  Rate of demographic growth: columns ([3] : [5] –1) x 100 
column 18  Demographic growth index (section 3.1.1, equation 4) 
column 19  Indicator of local financial needs: columns ([14]+[16]+[18]) : 3 (section 3.1.1, 
      equation  5) 
column 20  Global index of local fiscal capacity: columns (2x [12] + [19]) : 3 (section 3.1.1,  
      equation  6) 
column 21  Class assigned to commune i on the basis of its global index value 





  The last block of the worksheet (column 22 to 35) displays the procedure 
and the results of the distribution of one million Swiss francs across the 
communes on the basis of four different scenarios. Scenario 0 serves as a 
reference, with a distribution model based on the number of inhabitants in each 
commune. Scenario 1 employs the actual values of the global index of fiscal 
capacity (Ei). Scenario 2 relies on the division of communes in 6 classes, while 
scenario 3 applies the same method with 12 classes. 
 
  Starting out from what has been said in section 3 about the mutual influence 
between the objectives and procedures of equalisation, the present analysis will 
attempt to show how this interaction manifests itself in practice. 
 
4.2.1    Scenario 0: Distribution based on the legal population of 2000 
  
  The initial scenario (S0) operates with a simple linear (causal) distribution 
pattern. The allocation of the grants follows the statistical distribution of 
inhabitants across the communes. Accordingly, the amount of the grant 
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population (the legal population as of december 31, 2000; column 3 in Annex 
2) in the concerning commune. The distribution formula is the following: 
 









Relevant columns of the simulation worksheet in Annex 2: 
 
column 22   communal quota for commune i, with a value between 0 and 1 (see fraction in  
      equation  7) 
column 23   amount of transfer to commune i (equation 7). 
 
  We define S0 as the basic scenario in the sense that it serves as a basis for 
comparison in the three alternative scenarios presented below. If grants are 
distributed in function of the population size, this will evidently not contribute 
to the alleviation of fiscal disparities between the communes. Consequently, in 
per-capita terms, the size of the transfer will be the same for all communes, 
irrespective of their fiscal capacity. By contrast, the alternative scenarios all 
take notice of the differences in local fiscal capacity.  
 
4.2.2    Scenario 1: Distribution based on the index value continuum 
  
 This  approach  (S1) neglects the current practice of classification and 
replaces the assignment to individual classes with the actual value of the global 
fiscal capacity index for each commune. This creates a nearly continual scale 
where the number of steps equals the actual number of different index values. 


























where   Hi      legal population of commune i 
   Ei      value of the global index of fiscal capacity in commune i 
 
This scenario appears in the simulation worksheet as follows: 
 
column 24  communal quota for commune i (see fraction in equation 8) 
column 25  amount of transfer to commune i (equation 8) 
column 26  difference in the amount received by commune i in S1, compared to S0. 
 
  The inverse value of the global index in formula (8) indicates the negative 
correlation between the fiscal capacity of a commune and the amount of 
equalisation transfer for which it is eligible. 
 Local  fiscal  equalisation  in  Switzerland     July  2003           24 
  The distribution of grants on the basis of a continuous scale of index values 
boasts the advantage of smoothing the differences between the individual grant 
allocations. This benefit is especially appreciated by communes that would 
presumably be situated near a threshold value (marking the limit between two 
classes) if the equalisation system were based on classification. Such 
communes face the risk of a dramatic change in their fiscal position whenever 
higher-level authorities decide to reclassify the communes (section 3.3.2). 
Scenario 1 automatically eliminates any abrupt change of this kind. It is 
therefore logical to illustrate the continual distribution model with a curve 
rather than a step diagram. 
 
4.2.3    Scenario 2: Distribution based on six classes of communes  
  
  Compared to S1, this approach (S2) provides for a very simplified allocation 
of the available equalisation resources. S2 is the pattern currently used in the 
Canton of Fribourg (section 3.1.2). As has been explained in section 3.3.2, the 
system suffers from the roughness of the classification schedule. 
 
  In contrast to S1 where the reciprocal of the global index of fiscal capacity 
(1/Ei) is featuring in the nominator of the distribution formula, S2 operates with 
weights developed from the inverse class of each commune: 
 
 
class  1 2 3 4 5 6 
weight  6 5 4 3 2 1 
 
  As has been shown in section 3.3.2, the inverse class series chosen by the 
Canton of Fribourg (from 6 to 1) creates a sixfold distance between communes 
in class 1 and those in class 6 when it comes to the calculation of the 
multiplicator that is applied to the number of inhabitants. It has also been noted 
that the weight applied to the formula will double if a commune jumps from 
class 6 to class 5. The inverse class series enters the formula in the following 
way: 
 
000 000 1     S in      commune   to  transfer  Total       (9)
S2   






















where   Hi        legal population of commune i 
   Ci (inv S2)    the weight assigned to commune i 
 
The respective columns of the simulation worksheet are the following: 
 
column 27  weight (inverse class) assigned to commune i 
column 28  communal quota for commune i (see fraction in equation 9) 
column 29  amount of transfer to commune i (equation 9) 
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4.2.4    Scenario 3 – Distribution based on twelve classes of communes  
  
  Similarly to scenario 2, this pattern relies on the classification of communes 
but the number of classes has been extended from six to twelve.
20 This system 
smoothens, at least to a certain extent, the differences in the grant receipts of 
individual communes, since it allows a higher degree of differentiation 
between communes on the basis of their fiscal capacity. However, this 
smoothness is still very far from the situation resulting from S1 where class 
thresholds were simply eliminated. 
 
  As in S2, here we calculate again with the inverse classes. Evidently, this 
time the series of inverse classes extends from 12 to 1. The distribution is 
based on the following formula: 
 
000 ' 000 ' 1     S in      commune   to  transfer  Total       (10)
S3   


















where   Hi        legal population of commune i 
   C i (inv  S3)     the inverse class assigned to commune i in S3. 
 
Columns 31 to 35 of the worksheet demonstrate the calculation process as 
follows: 
 
column 31  class assigned to commune i in a 12-class system 
column 32  weight (inverse class) assigned to commune i 
column 33  communal quota for commune i (see fraction in equation 10) 
column 34  amount of transfer to commune i (equation 10) 




4.3.1 Aggregate  results 
 
  Columns 26, 30 and 35 in Annex 2 show the incidences of each distribution 
pattern: they indicate how the net financial position of each commune will 
change as a result of the alternative distribution practices S1 (fiscal capacity 
index values), S2 (six classes) and S3 (twelve classes) respectively, compared to 
the starting position marked in scenario S0 where the sum of one million Swiss 
francs was distributed among the communes in linear function of their 
population size. A negative figure in any of the columns 26, 30 or 35 indicates 
that the net fiscal position of the respective commune would deteriorate if the 
system of linear distribution were changed into the particular system 
                                                 
20   By doing this, we followed the same principles as the Cantonal Council did when it defined 
the thresholds for the six-class system. Our aim was to ensure that for any commune, the 
probability of falling into any of the twelve classes be equal. The theoretical probabilities of 
distribution as well as the threshold values for both the six-class and the twelve-class systems 
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corresponding to the column. Likewise, positive figures indicate an 
improvement. From the magnitude of the difference in the total transfer amount 
we can draw a direct conclusion with regard to the degree of deterioration or 
improvement. Nevertheless, comparisons of incidence at the level of individual 
communes can only be made on the basis of per-capita outcomes. These will be 
shown later on. The distributional incidences are evaluated based upon three 
aspects summarized in the box below: (1) the number of beneficiary communes 
(scope of equalisation); (2) the volume of effective equalisation, and (3) the 
relative gains and losses of individual communes.  
 
 
Evaluation of the distributional incidences 
 Aspect                                      Scenario 
 of evaluation 
S1 S 2 S 3 
Number of net receivers  170  126  126 
Number of net contributors  36 80 80 
(1) Scope of equalisation 
Total 206  206  206 
(2) Volume of effective equalisation 
= Total revenue surplus flowing to net receiver 







Communes in favour of Sn  79.5* 70.5*  56 
Population concerned  156’834  50’031 28’893 
(3) Relative gains and 
losses of individual 
communes 
in % of total population  66.5 %  21.2 %  12.3 % 
* As the commune of Ferpicloz would lose 440 Swiss francs both in S1 and S2, its one vote has 
been shared between the two scenarios. Accordingly, the numbers of communes voting against 
these scenarios are reduced by 0.5 each. 
 
 
(1) Evaluation in terms of the scope of equalisation 
  If the distribution formula is based on the actual Ei index values (as in S1), 
then 170 communes out of the 206 can register an improvement in their fiscal 
position (they are net receivers), while the remaining 36 must give up a part of 
their grant receipts in favour of the communes with the weakest fiscal capacity. 
 
  Should the classification method be applied (S2 or S3), in that case there are 
126 net receivers against 80 net contributors. This rate is obviously identical 
for both the six-class and the twelve-class scales, in accordance with principle 
(iii) in section 3.1.2 which implies that the amount of contributions paid by the 
communes in the upper half of the scale must be equal to the amount of 
transfers to received by the communes in the lower half of the scale. 
 
  Regarding thus the scope of equalisation (the number of net receiver, or 
beneficiary communes), the distribution of transfers on the basis of the index 
value continuum (S1) ranks better than any of the alternative patterns (patterns 
based on classification) in comparison to S0. 
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(2) Evaluation in terms of the volume of effective equalisation: 
  The volume of effective equalisation is measured by the amount of revenue 
surplus received by the entire group of beneficiary communes under the 
respective distribution patterns. Thus, in each scenario, these sums represent 
the respective aggregate volumes of revenue allocation, allowing us to judge 
how much revenue may be mobilised for the purposes of equalisation. Viewed 
under this perspective, S3 would perform better than the alternative scenarios. 
The aggregate revenue surplus of 268'433 Swiss francs against the total amount 
distributed among the communes (one million) means that of each Swiss franc 
transferred to the communes, almost 27 cents effectively serve equalisation 
purposes. 
 
(3) Evaluation in terms of relative gains and losses of individual communes 
  Assuming that voters in any given commune behave rationally, every voter 
will seek to maximise the benefits or minimise the losses of his commune of 
residence when the three alternative distribution scenarios are put to direct 
vote. Accordingly, they will vote on the alternative that promises the highest 
obtainable revenue surplus against the initial position S0 for their respective 
communes. Likewise, financially strong communes losing out to poorer ones in 
terms of receipts in all three scenarios will presumably opt for the alternative 
that implies the lowest possible revenue cut compared to their initial position. 
 
  To find out which of the three scenarios have the greatest chance to win on a 
cantonal scale when the question is put to direct popular vote, we picked out 
the maximum of the three difference values appearing in every single line of 
the simulation worksheet, at the cross sections with columns 26, 30 and 35. 
Then we counted how many communes would opt for each of the three 
scenarios and how many communes would be in opposition. 
 
  Results show that in case of a direct vote, S1 (continual indices of fiscal 
capacity) would be the winning alternative, with the support of two-third of the 
individual votes (the population figures of the supporter communes add up to 
156'834, which corresponds to 66.5 % of the total population in the canton). 
Scenario S2 (classification with six classes) would come out second, with 21.2 
% of the votes, although the number of communes that prefer this scenario is 
not much lower than those favouring S1 (70.5 against 79.5),
 which indicates 
that this alternative is proposed predominantly by small communes. Finally, S3 
(classification with twelve classes) would attract a modest 12.3 % of the total 
population of the canton. 
 
3.3.2  Per-capita results 
 
  The combined line-and-bar chart in Annex 3 allows us to trace the 
development of the net fiscal position of inhabitants in the communes in case 
of the alternative scenarios S1, S2 and S3. The basis of comparison is the 
outcome of a constant linear distribution of the given one million Swiss francs 
as it happens in scenario S0. Each of the two bar charts (representing S2 and S3) 
as well as the curve diagram (S1) plotted in the box use the same variables: the Local  fiscal  equalisation  in  Switzerland     July  2003           28 
dependent variable, on the horizontal axis, is the global index of fiscal capacity 
in the commune (Ei), while the independent variable, on the vertical axis, is the 
net difference in revenue surplus divided by the legal population 2000, 
compared to the revenue surplus that would result from a linear distribution in 
S0. Evidently, the distributional incidences of S0 yield a constant linear 
function (with every commune receiving 4.24 Swiss francs per inhabitant) that 
perfectly coincides with the horizontal axis, since the zero per-capita marginal 
net benefit (or transfer revenue) is the starting point for our comparison. 
 
  In the alternative scenarios, obviously, the index of global fiscal capacity is 
relevant, as its actual value determines the net marginal revenue the inhabitants 
can gain or lose through the respective equalisation schemes. Accordingly, by 
means of their equalising component, all three alternative distribution patterns 
will lead to a situation where the communes with the weakest fiscal capacity 
(communes situated on the horizontal axis near the origin) gain the highest 
surplus revenue per capita, while communes with strong finances compared to 
other communes within the canton (close to the right end of the horizontal axis) 
are forced to receive less or to pay more to maintain the cantonal equalisation 
policy. In each alternative case the per-capita incidences of distribution are thus 
illustrated by downward sloping functions that express the inverse relationship 
between the fiscal capacity of the commune and the change in the net fiscal 
position of the inhabitants. Differences are observed solely in the position of 
the functions within the two-dimensional space of co-ordinate axes, as well as 
in their shape (line or scale, depending on the continuity of the function).
21 The 
graph demonstrates that, in terms of the volume of effective equalisation, S3 
performs better than any other alternatives. The additional amount of benefit 
drawn by the inhabitants of communes with low fiscal capacity and, likewise, 
the marginal contribution paid by the residents of well-off communes, are 
higher than in either of the alternative scenarios S1 or S2. 
 
 
5.    Conclusions 
 
  The formally vertical, latent horizontal system of fiscal equalisation in the 
Canton Fribourg raises several questions about the actual incidences of the 
transfer allocation. The evaluation of the incidences allows researchers to make 
judgements about the quality of equalisation and to measure its conformity 
with the guiding principles established by policymakers. It also spurs them to 
                                                 
21   In order to make up for the absence of an additional six-class scale on the horizontal axis, in 
the graph we reduplicated the bar charts of the S2 distribution function. This is meant to 
indicate that classes 12 and 11 in S3 together approximately correspond to class 6 in S2.  This 
assumption is certainly not quite appropriate, yet it is necessary in order to avoid the 
overcomplication of the graph. Annex 1 explicitly shows that the reclassification of communes 
from a six-class into a twelve-class system has necessitated some minor adjustments to the 
original set of thresholds, otherwise the principle of non-concentration (or equal distribution) 
of communes across the classes could not have been respected. The observation of these 
adjustments, however, would force us to accommodate two different, not-overlapping scales on 
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draw up other distribution patterns and compare these to the existing system in 
terms of equity and efficiency.  
 
  Based on four different patterns of transfer distribution, the simulation of 
incidences on each of the 206 communes in the Canton Fribourg has led to a 
number of remarkable conclusions. These can be summarised as follows: 
 
  The choice of the most appropriate distribution pattern by the canton 
depends heavily on the choice of the primary objective of the local 
equalisation policy. 
  If the prior interest of the cantonal equalisation policy lies in maximising the 
number of beneficiaries (i.e. the scope of equalisation), a distribution 
system based on a continual scale of fiscal capacity index values performs 
better than any classification-based system. 
  If the canton seeks to maximise the volume of effective equalisation, a 
system of twelve classes is likely to bring more favourable results than 
either the six-class system or the continual index scale. 
  In case the question is put to direct popular vote in every commune, those 
distribution schemes that establish a direct link between the actual fiscal 
capacity of the commune and the size of the accessible grant will enjoy 
more support among the voters than any of the classification-based 
distribution schemes, as these latter fail to provide such a link. 
 
 
  Considering that the simulation results do not show a convincing case for 
S2, the pattern currently used in the Canton Fribourg, the researchers of the 
University of Fribourg will launch further studies with the aim to explore the 
reasons for the relatively weak performance of this pattern. At a later stage of 
the research, a number of alternative patterns may have to be checked on their 
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ANNEX 1: Classification procedure (methodological supplement) 
 
A. Theoretical probabilities of class assignment in scenario S2 (method of moving averages, classes from 1 to 6) 
 
              Theoretical probability* 
         1/2 (class 1)     1/2 x 4/6 x 1/2 =    1/6 
     4/6 (classes 1,2)  1/2 (class 2)     1/2 x 4/6 x 1/2 =    1/6 
   1/2   2/3 x 1/2 (class 3)        1/2 x 1/2 x 2/3 =    1/6 
 (classes 1,2,3)             
206 communes                
  1/2   2/3 x 1/2 (class 4)       1/2 x 1/2 x 2/3 =    1/6 
 (classes  4,5,6)   4/6 (classes 5,6)   1/2 (class 5)     1/2 x 4/6 x 1/2 =    1/6 
       1/2 (class 6)     1/2 x 4/6 x 1/2 =    1/6 
 
 
                
 
 
Upper limit of class 3:  100 + 2/3 x (E 1,2,3  – 100) = 100 + 2/3 x (130.46 – 100) = 120.31 
     *Probability for  a commune of falling in 
the respective class 
Lower limit of class 4:  100 – 2/3 x (100 – E 4,5,6) = 100 - 2/3 x (100 – 82.55) = 88.37     





B. Threshold values for S2 (years 2003-2004) 
 
 
Class  Lower limit  Upper limit 
6    78.50 
5  78.51  88.36 
4  88.37  99.99 
3  100.00  120.30 
2  120.31  156.26 
1  156.27   
 
Source: (Dafflon, 1981: 112);  (Conseil d'État, 1989b: 17);  and Department of Communes of the Canton Fribourg. Local  fiscal  equalisation  in  Switzerland     July  2003           34 
 
ANNEX 1 (continued): Classification procedure (methodological supplement) 
 
C. Theoretical probabilities of class assignment in scenario S3 (method of moving averages, classes from 1 to 12) 
  
               Theoretical probability* 
         1/2 (classes 1,2)   1/2 (class 1)  1/2 x 4/6 x 1/2 x 1/2 =    1/12 
     4/6 (classes 1,2,3,4)     1/2 (class 2)  1/2 x 4/6 x 1/2 x 1/2 =    1/12 
   1/2       1/2 (classes 3,4)   1/2 (class 3)  1/2 x 4/6 x 1/2 x 1/2 =    1/12 
 (classes 1,2,3,4,5,6)         1/2 (class 4)  1/2 x 4/6 x 1/2 x 1/2 =    1/12 
             1/2 (class 5)  1/2 x 1/2 x 2/3 x 1/2 =    1/12 
     2/3 x 1/2 (classes 5,6)     1/2 (class 6)  1/2 x 1/2 x 2/3 x 1/2 =    1/12 
206 communes                  
     2/3 x 1/2 (classes 7,8)     1/2 (class 7)  1/2 x 1/2 x 2/3 x 1/2 =    1/12 
             1/2 (class 8)  1/2 x 1/2 x 2/3 x 1/2 =    1/12 
   1/2           1/2 (class 9)  1/2 x 4/6 x 1/2 x 1/2 =    1/12 
 (classes 7,8,9,10,11,12)     1/2 (classes 9,10)   1/2 (class 10)  1/2 x 4/6 x 1/2 x 1/2 =    1/12 
     4/6 (classes 9,10,11,12)     1/2 (class 11)  1/2 x 4/6 x 1/2 x 1/2 =    1/12 
         1/2 (classes 11,12)   1/2 (class 12)  1/2 x 4/6 x 1/2 x 1/2 =    1/12 
                   
Upper limit of class 5:  100 + 2/3 x (E1,2,3,4,5,6  –  100) = 100 + 2/3 x (130.46 – 100) = 120.31       *Probability for a commune of falling in 
the respective class 
Lower limit of class 8:  100 – 2/3 x (100 – E 7,8,9,10,11,12) = 100 - 2/3 x (100 – 82.55) = 88.37     
 where E x,…z = average index of the fiscal capacity of communes in classes x to z       
 
 
D. Threshold values for S3 (hypothetical values) 
 
                    (continued) 
Class  Lower limit  Upper limit    Class  Lower limit  Upper limit 
12    72.98    6  100.00  108.95 
11  72.99  78.51    5  108.96  120.31 
10  78.52  83.22    4  120.32  132.80 
9  83.23  88.36    3  132.81  156.27 
8  88.37  93.39    2  156.28  191.47 
7  93.40  99.99    1  191.48   
 
Source:  own calculation based on (Dafflon, 1981: 112) and (Conseil d'État, 1989b: 17).Local  fiscal  equalisation  in  Switzerland     July  2003           35 
ANNEX 2:  Fragment of the original simulation worksheet     
      Input data series for a selected commune and Canton Fribourg and procedure of data processing 
 
Input data 
Federal no.  Commune  Legal population  Resident population  Legal population  Area   Number of full-
time employed  Tax revenue 1999  Tax revenue 1998  Average tax 
revenue  
Per-capita average tax 
revenue 
   31.12.2000  31.12.2000  31.12.1990  km
2   CHF  CHF  CHF  CHF 




(t-10) A i L i     T cantonal(i) T cantonal(i) / LPi 
1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 = (8 + 9) : 2  11 = 10 : 3 
2171 Arconciel  654  650  559  6.11  46  1'924'297  1'967'448  1'945'873  2'975.34 
… …  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  … 



















Indicator of local 
financial needs 
Global index of local 
fiscal capacity  Class 
  (persons/km
2)    (%)    (%)         
LFRi    PDi    EAi    DGi  LFNi  Ei  Ci 
 
12  13 = 4 : 6  14  15 = 7 : 3  16  17 = 3 : 5  18  19 = (14 + 16 + 
18) : 3  20 = (2x12 + 1x19) : 3  21 
Arconciel 122.82  106.38  88.87  7.03  164.02  16.99  98.35  117.08  120.91  2 
… …  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  … 
Canton Fribourg  100.00  151.55  100.00  31.04  100.00  13.70  100.00  100.00  100.00   
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ANNEX 2 (continued): Fragment of the original simulation worksheet 
        Input data series for a selected commune and Canton Fribourg and procedure of data processing 
 
S0: causal distribution  S1: index value continuum 
Communal quota     
in S0  Total transfer in S0  Communal quota 
in S1  Total transfer in S1  Difference (S1-S0) 
  CHF    CHF  CHF 
LPi / Σ  LPi  (LPi / Σ  LPi) x 1 000 000  LPi  x (100 / Ei) 
[LPi  x (100 / Ei) x 1 000 000]  
/ Σ  [LPi x (100 / Ei)]  ∆  (S1-S0) 
 
22  23  24  25  26 = (25 - 23) 
Arconciel  0.002774  2'774  541  2'279  -495 
…  …  …  …  …  … 




S2: distribution by classes (1 to 6)  S3: distribution by classes (1 to 12) 
Inverse class (or 
weight) in S2 
Communal 
quota in S2  Total transfer in S2 Difference  (S2-S0)  Class in S3  Inverse class (or 
weight) in S3 
Communal 
quota in S3  Total transfer in S3  Difference (S3-S0) 
  CHF  CHF        CHF  CHF 
Ci (inv)  LPi / Ci (inv) 
[(LPi / Ci (inv)) x  
1 000 000] / Σ  (LPi /  
Ci (inv)) 
∆  (S2-S0)  Ci (3)  Ci (inv) (3)  LPi / Ci (inv) (3) 
[(LPi / Ci (inv) (3) x 1 000 000]  
/ Σ  (LPi / Ci (inv) (3))  ∆  (S3-S0) 
 
27 28  29 30 = (29 - 23)  31  32  33  34  35 = (34 - 23) 
Arconciel 5  131  1'399  -1'375  4  9  73  1'344  -1'430 
…  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  … 
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 ANNEX 4:    Change in the net fiscal revenue per inhabitant as an outcome of a switch from S0 to alternative scenarios 
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